

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
PORTLAND, OREGON**

In the Matter of

Respondent.

File Number: A -516

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Charge: INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I): Not in possession of a valid entry document

Application: Asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture.

On Behalf of Respondent:

Jennifer Rotman
Immigrant Law Group, PC

On Behalf of ICE:

CC Vassar
Assistant Chief Counsel

DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

I. Introduction & Procedural History

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated these removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) against Respondent, with the Elizabeth, New Jersey Court on August 5, 2014. Ex. 1. The NTA alleges that Respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States at Hidalgo, Texas on 2014 without a valid entry document and without being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. *Id.* Based on these allegations, DHS charged Respondent as inadmissible under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “Act”). *Id.*

Respondent was placed into removal proceedings after an asylum officer found that she had a credible fear. Ex. 2 at 5-17. Venue was changed to Portland, Oregon. At a master calendar hearing on December 17, 2014, Respondent admitted the allegations, conceded the charge, and declined to designate a country of removal. The Court directed El Salvador as the country of removal as necessary. Respondent applied for asylum and related relief on that date. Ex. 3. The Court heard Respondent’s testimony at an individual hearing on , 2016.

Respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador who has admitted the factual allegations and conceded the charge of removability. I find that the charge has been sustained as a matter of law by clear and convincing evidence. For the following reasons, I GRANT Respondent's applications for asylum and withholding of removal.

II. Burden of Proof

Respondent bears the burden of proving eligibility for relief. *Halim v. Holder*, 590 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2009); *Rendon v. Mukasey*, 520 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2008). The provisions of the Real ID Act apply because the applications were filed after 2005. REAL ID Act § 101(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 305; *Matter of S-B-*, 24 I&N Dec. 42, 43 (BIA 2006).

III. Evidentiary Rulings

I have considered all admitted evidence regardless of whether I specifically mention it in this decision. The following exhibits were entered into evidence without objection:

- Exhibit 1: DHS form I-862, Notice to Appear;
- Exhibit 2: DHS Evidence Submission;
- Exhibit 3: Respondent's I-589 Asylum Application;
- Exhibit 4: Frivolous Asylum Application Warning;
- Exhibit 5: Department of State 2014 Human Rights Report for El Salvador; and
- Exhibit 6: Respondent's Prehearing Statement and Evidence Submission.

A. Respondent's Testimony

Respondent was born on _____ in _____, El Salvador. Respondent came to the United States in June 2014. Before arriving in the United States, Respondent lived with her mother and siblings in _____ El Salvador. Respondent has six brothers and sisters: _____ (age 24), _____ (age 23), _____ (age 22), _____ (age 20), _____ (age 18), and _____ (age 17). Respondent's father died in 2011 from kidney failure.

_____ is a rural area. Respondent's family was very poor; they worked in agriculture. Respondent attended high school at the Nacional Institute de _____ in _____, _____, about a 25 to 30 minute drive by car from Respondent's home. She graduated in November 2013.

When Respondent was in high school, two of Respondent's female classmates often hit Respondent and threatened her. The classmates said their brother, who belonged to the Mara 18, would "take it out" on them if they did not hurt Respondent.

In January 2014, shortly after Respondent graduated from high school, men arrived in black cars with tinted windows in Respondent's town. The people in the community knew that they were members of the Mara 18 who arrived to patrol the area. They watched people's houses and broke in and stole their belongings. They did this in order to intimidate people in the community and to control the area. They also demanded rent money from stores.

On February 10, 2014, Respondent's family found a letter on the door of their house. The letter said that they wanted \$5,000 or else they will kill Respondent's family. The letter did not identify who it was from, but Respondent and her family believed it was from the Mara 18.

Respondent's family did not pay the demand letter because they did not have that kind of money. Also, Respondent testified that if they had paid, the Mara 18 would have "taken total control" and continued to threaten them for money. The nearest police station was in _____, an urban area about a 15 minute car ride away. Respondent and her family did not report this threat to the police because the gangs have infiltrated the police. Respondent testified that everyone in her community knew that when a person goes to the police, the police tell the gang members and the gang members kill that person's family in retaliation.

On February 19, 2014, shortly after Respondent's family received the demand letter, three armed men dressed in black with their faces covered came into Respondent's family's house. Respondent believes they were members of the Mara 18; she saw a tattoo with a symbol of the gang on one of their faces. The men asked Respondent and her family for the \$5,000, and if Respondent's family did not give them money, they will take one of Respondent's family members as hostage. The men forced Respondent, her mother, and her sisters to sit on the sofa, and they tied up Respondent's brothers. They beat Respondent's brother _____ and one of the men fired a shot into one of the rooms. They held Respondent and her family for about four hours. They became more aggressive when Respondent and her family refused to give them the money, and they told Respondent and her family that they knew where they went to church. Before they left, the gang members took everything electronic in the house. They gave Respondent's brother a chip to put into his cell phone so that they could call him.

The Mara 18 members called Respondent's brother and told him they wanted the money. They said they would come to collect the money at a certain date and time, and they threatened to kill him and his family. On April 20, 2014, Respondent and his family were home when three of the gang members tried to break into their house. They tried to break the doors and said they were going to come in and rape all the women if they did not get the money. The men tried to enter the house from the roof as well, and they fired a gun shot. Respondent's mother had a heart attack, but Respondent and her siblings had to wait until the Mara 18 left to take her to the hospital. After two hours, the Mara 18 members left the house and Respondent and her siblings took their mother to the hospital. She died two days later.

Respondent fled El Salvador a few weeks later. After Respondent left, members of the Mara 18 went into another house in her community and killed the father of a family, and raped a young woman who was living with her grandmother.

Respondent left El Salvador because she feared that the men from the Mara 18 who came to her house would rape her or kill her because she did not pay them the money they ordered her to pay. Respondent spoke to her sister recently, who is still living in El Salvador. Her sister told her that a stranger inquired about who is living in their house. Respondent believes the men are still looking for her.

IV. Analysis

A. Credibility Determination

In all applications for asylum, the Court must make a threshold determination of a respondent's credibility. *Matter of O-D-*, 21 I&N Dec. 1079, 1081 (BIA 1998). An applicant's testimony is sufficient to establish eligibility if it is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis of her fear. *Aden v. Holder*, 589 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009); *Deloso v. Ashcroft*, 393 F.3d 858, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2005); 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(a). A credibility finding may be based on the applicant's demeanor, candor, or responsiveness; the inherent plausibility of the applicant's account; the consistency between the applicant's written and oral statements (whenever made, whether or not made under oath, and in consideration of the circumstances under which the statements were made); the internal consistency of each such statement; the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record; any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements; or any other relevant factor. *Shrestha v. Holder*, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010).

I carefully observed Respondent when she testified and I find that she was fully credible. She was soft spoken, forthright with the Court, and understandably emotional at certain points during her testimony. She interacted appropriately with the Court and the attorneys, and her testimony was consistent with the evidence in the record. I therefore grant her testimony full evidentiary weight and next analyze whether the testimony and evidence presented is sufficient to establish eligibility for relief. *See Nuru v. Gonzales*, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that where a respondent is found credible, her testimony is "deemed true, and the question remaining to be answered becomes whether these facts, and their reasonable inferences, satisfy the elements of the claim for relief").

B. Asylum

The INA authorizes the Attorney General to grant asylum to a non-citizen who qualifies as a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1). A refugee is an individual who is unable or unwilling to return to her country of nationality because she has experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42); *Donchev v. Mukasey*, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009).

1. Past persecution

To establish past persecution, an applicant must show (1) an incident, or incidents, of harm that rise to the level of persecution; (2) inflicted 'on account of' one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) by the government or forces the government is unable or unwilling to control. *Baghdasaryan v. Holder*, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010); *Navas v. INS*, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2000).

a. Harm rising to the level of persecution

Asylum law defines persecution as "a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive." *Sangha v. INS*, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997). It is "an extreme concept, marked by the infliction of suffering or harm." *Li v. Ashcroft*, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Persecution may also be emotional or psychological. *Mashiri v. Ashcroft*, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2004); *see also Khup v. Ashcroft*, 376 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2004). Threats of serious harm, especially when combined with mistreatment and the ability to carry it out, can constitute persecution. *See Mashiri v. Ashcroft*, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2004); *Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder*, 667 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that being forced to flee home in face of immediate threat of violence may constitute persecution, as long as persecutor's actions are motivated by a protected ground). Moreover, indirect threats can be sufficient to constitute persecution. *Artiga Turcios v. INS*, 829 F.2d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1987). The court looks at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an applicant has suffered persecution. *Guo v. Ashcroft*, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Mara 18 left a threatening letter on the door to Respondent's house requesting money, and she and her family were held held hostage for four hours after they did not pay the extortion. The Mara 18 members beat Respondent's brother in front of her. They continued to terrorize her family and attempted to break into to their house, during which time Respondent's mother suffered from a heart attack and was unable to receive medical help. She passed away two days later as a result. Respondent was diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder due to the trauma she experienced from these events. Ex. 6 at 1-3. Respondent suffered harm that rises to the level of persecution.

b. On account of a protected ground

An asylum applicant must also show that the harm she suffered was inflicted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42)(A). Respondent must establish that a protected ground was "at least one central reason" for the persecution she suffered. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Parussimova v. Mukasey*, 555

F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009); *Matter of J-B-N & S-M*, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007). A “central reason” is one of primary importance that is essential to the persecutor’s motive. *Parussimova*, 555 F.3d at 741.

1. Imputed Political Opinion

An imputed political opinion arises when “[a] persecutor falsely attributes an opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim because of that mistaken belief about the victim’s views.” *Baghdasaryan v. Holder*, 592 F.3d 1018, 1024 n.6, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Canas-Segovia v. INS*, 970 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Persecution on account of imputed political opinion ... satisfies the motive requirement, whether or not that imputation is accurate.” *Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft*, 371 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing *Lopez-Galarza v. INS*, 99 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court’s “analysis focuses on how the persecutor perceive[s] the applicant’s actions and allegiances, and what motivate[s] their abuse.” *Agbuya v. INS*, 241 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

DHS argues that members of the Mara 18 harmed Respondent as part of their extortion efforts for financial gain, and not on account of any real or imputed political opinion. Generally, “persecution on account of political opinion ... can[not] be inferred merely from acts of random violence by members of a village or political subdivision against their neighbors who may or may not have divergent ... political views.” *Ochave v. INS*, 254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting *Sangha v. INS*, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997)). In *Santos Lemus v. Mukasey*, the Ninth Circuit rejected a respondent’s assertion that he suffered past persecution on account of a political opinion stemming from his refusal to join the gangs. 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008) *abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder*, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court held that the respondent “did not present evidence that he was politically or ideologically opposed to the ideals espoused by the Mara or to gangs in general.” *Id.* at 747. Rather, “the available evidence suggests instead that [the respondent] was victimized for economic and personal reasons.” *Id.*; *see also Barrios v. Holder*, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009)(the respondent “failed to present evidence that he was politically or ideologically opposed to the ideals espoused by the gang that recruited him (or to gangs in general), or that the gang imputed to him any particular political belief”). Here, however, Respondent presented evidence that the harm she suffered by the gangs was not merely for economic and personal reasons. Rather, the evidence in the record indicates that in parts of El Salvador, including where Respondent lived, the interests of the gangs have transformed from street groups who seek economic and personal advantage to a powerful group with political influence where failure to adhere to their demands is viewed by them as political opinion.

Respondent argues that the area in El Salvador where she and her family lived, the gangs were the de facto governing body. Although the Court does not find that the evidence unequivocally indicates that gangs in El Salvador have completely usurped the role of the Salvadoran government, there is no doubt that the MS 13 and M-18 gangs do exercise political influence in areas within El Salvador through violence and intimidation tactics—the same way that organized crime in the United States and elsewhere at have at times exerted political

influence over parts of the populace. That is, these gangs are no longer ad hoc street criminals—rather, they have crossed the threshold into organized crime where their objective is not merely self-enrichment, but to establish political influence in a society whose government, due to its own corruption and self-dealing, is unable or unwilling to intervene.

According to an expert affidavit by Elizabeth Kennedy, the MS 13 and M-18 are “high order gangs” and “sophisticated organizations with their own organizational objectives” who “use their power of the population in vast areas that they control to function much the way a government does.” Ex. 6 at 40. “[B]ased upon physical force, citizen respect, ability to control territory and ability to collect taxes, MS 13 and M-18 are the most powerful actors in El Salvador in all but a few areas.” *Id.* at 41. Mr. Manwaring describes the M-18 as “third-generation gang,” which he defines as “a gang which has evolved from a street gang to a sophisticated gang which exercises dominion over physical space through a sophisticated organization structure, agreed upon codes of conduct and methods of communication and the ability to create and enforce rules against the general populace.” *Id.* at 113-14. According to a third expert affidavit by Roberto Lovato, Respondent and her family live in an area where “gangs exercise almost total power,” and where “the police and security forces have little to no influence.” *Id.* at 100. Respondent has thus established that the M-18 have attained the size and scope of significant political actors in her area.

Further, Respondent has also established that in such areas where the M-18 have obtained such strong influence, resistance to the demands of the M-18 is viewed by the gangs as a political opinion. The payments that the M-18 require from the general populace is not “so much to create income or wealth for the gang, but to establish and maintain the political control that will enable achievement of objectives.” *Id.* at 117. The M-18 “view any resistance, or even overt neutrality, as a political threat.” *Id.* at 118. Further, “[i]f an individual resists or is perceived to resist, the gang externalizes that individual by construing them as a dissident, disobedient, or a threat to the gang.” *Id.* at 116.

Furthermore, the M-18 is particularly vicious and violent to those whom they believe constitute a threat to their power. Members of the M-18 are “[b]rutal in their response to those who disrespect them... [they] exact revenge for defiance and perceived defiance.” *Id.* at 44-45. “Once the gangs have this level of control over an area, a family or individuals refusal to accede to their demands (e.g. fail to pay extortion demand) makes them very vulnerable to violence since the gang will continue to send a message of their power by exerting violence, including killing or raping, those defiant individuals.” *Id.* at 100. “For any resident who defies the MS 13 or M-18, the consequence can quickly become murder.” *Id.* at 43. As such, Respondent has established that resistance to the M-18 in the area where she and her family lived can constitute a political opinion under the Act.

Lastly, Respondent has established that at least “one central reason” the M-18 harmed Respondent’s family because Respondent and her family were viewed as a threat to their power in the area, and thus, they are viewed by the gang as having an imputed political opinion. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). Respondent testified that she lived in an area where the M-18 has taken almost

complete political control. The gang members made their presence known through stealing from, murdering, and raping those living in Respondent's town. Members of the M-18 took Respondent and her family captive and beat Respondent's brother after Respondent's family did not pay the money demanded of them. The gang continued to monitor Respondent's family and tried to break into Respondent's house to exact revenge. For these reasons, Respondent has established that she and her family were harmed by the gangs on account of their imputed political opinion.

2. Particular Social Group

Respondent has articulated that she was persecuted on account of a number of particular social groups. As the Court finds that Respondent has shown persecution on account of political opinion, however, it declines to rule on whether the articulated particular social groups are cognizable.

c. By the government or forces the government is unable or unwilling to control

Respondent must also show that she would be unable to avail herself of the protection of the Salvadoran government. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i); *see also Castro-Martinez v. Holder*, 674 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011); *Avetova-Elisseva v. INS*, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000). An applicant can demonstrate that the government is unable or unwilling to protect her from persecution by establishing that private persecution of a particular sort is widespread and well-known but not controlled by the government or by showing that others have made reports of similar incidents to no avail. *Castro-Martinez*, 674 F.3d at 1081.

Further, there is no per se requirement that an asylum applicant have reported the abuse. *Rahimzadeh v. Holder*, 613 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2010). When the applicant fails to file a report, there is a "gap in proof" as to how the government would have responded. *Castro-Martinez*, 674 F.3d at 1081. An applicant can remedy this gap by convincingly establishing that going to authorities would have been futile or subjected her to further abuse. *Id.* In addition, a government's inability or unwillingness to control a non-governmental actor can be shown by "demonstrating that a country's laws or customs effectively deprive the petitioner of any meaningful recourse to government protection." *Rahimzadeh*, 613 F.3d at 921.

As stated above, the evidence shows that the M-18 have are politically influential in many areas in El Salvador, including the area where Respondent lives. Further, the evidence conclusively establishes that severe human rights abuses perpetrated by the M-18 are widespread and well-known but not controlled by the Salvadoran government. *See generally* Ex. 6. The 2014 United States Department of State Human Rights Report describes "widespread corruption," and "weaknesses in the judiciary and security forces that contributed to a high level of impunity" to be the "principal human rights problems" in El Salvador. Ex. 5 at 1. The report details that gangs exercise influence within the prisons and judicial system, and gang intimidation and violence against witnesses contributed to a climate of impunity from criminal

prosecution. *Id.* at 4, 8. Lastly, a police officer was convicted of homicide which he had committed upon receiving a bribe from a gang. *Id.* at 2.

Respondent testified that the M-18 has infiltrated the local police and that if she had reported the harm she suffered, the police would notify the gang members, and she would risk retaliation from the gang. Such assertion is corroborated by the evidence in the record. Ex. 6 at 28-32. Thus, in light of the country conditions evidence and Respondent's testimony, the Court finds that Respondent is unable to avail herself of the protection of the Salvadoran government. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i); *Castro-Martinez*, 674 F.3d at 1081.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Respondent suffered past persecution under the Act. See *Navas*, 217 F.3d at 655-56.

3. Well-founded fear of future persecution

Because Respondent has demonstrated past persecution, she is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i); *Mamouzian v. Ashcroft*, 390 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004); *Ruano v. Ashcroft*, 301 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). DHS can overcome this presumption only by showing that (1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the country of removal; or (2) she could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the country, and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect her to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). Generalized information from a Department of State report on country conditions is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of future persecution. See *Molina-Estrada v. INS*, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, DHS must introduce evidence that, on an individualized basis, rebuts the applicant's specific grounds for fearing future persecution. *Gonzales-Hernandez v. Ashcroft*, 336 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003); *Salaam v. INS*, 229 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, DHS did not present evidence that would rebut the presumption that Respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution. Rather, as described above, country conditions evidence supports a finding that those who are targeted by gangs because they are viewed as undermining the political power of the gangs face persecution and a lack of governmental protection. See generally Ex. 6. In sum, Respondent has adequately established that, because of persecution on account of her particular social group and her inability to avail herself of the protection of the Salvadoran government, she falls within the statutory definition of a refugee as provided in INA § 208(b)(1)(B).

4. The exercise of discretion

Asylum is a two-step process which requires an applicant to establish refugee status and to then show that she merits relief as a matter of discretion. *Kalubi v. Ashcroft*, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004). The court must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors, including

the severity of the persecution suffered. See *Kazlauskas v. INS*, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1995). Respondent has satisfied all of the elements of a meritorious asylum claim and merits the favorable exercise of discretion. See *Li*, 356 F.3d at 1160; *Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. at 428. An application is viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. *Matter of Pula*, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 473 (BIA 1987). The danger of persecution outweighs all but the most egregious adverse factors. See *Matter of Chen*, 20 I&N Dec. 16, 20-21 (BIA 1989). There are no negative factors in Respondent's application. I grant her application in the exercise of discretion.

C. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal requires an applicant to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened in her home country because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. *Tamang v. Holder*, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010); *Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. at 421. Courts consider the same factors to determine eligibility for both asylum and withholding, but withholding of removal requires a higher probability of persecution. *Lanza v. Ashcroft*, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). The applicant must show a "clear probability" of the threat to life or freedom in her home country. *Tamang*, 598 F.3d at 1091. As with asylum, past persecution generates a presumption of eligibility for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1); see also *Mousa*, 530 F.3d at 1030.

Respondent suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution. As discussed above, the Government has not rebutted the presumption. Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is mandatory when an applicant qualifies. Therefore, I grant Respondent's application.

D. Relief under the Convention Against Torture


Respondent has been granted asylum and withholding of removal. It is therefore not necessary to grant her CAT relief, which would afford her no relief beyond that which she has already been granted. Therefore, I consider Respondent's application for relief under the CAT withdrawn.

ORDERS

It is **HEREBY ORDERED** that Respondent _____ applications for asylum and withholding of removal are **GRANTED**.

Any appeal of this decision is due to the BIA in not less than 30 calendar days or the next business day thereafter (May 31, 2016).

April 24, 2016
Date



Michael H. Bennett
Immigration Judge